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ABSTRACT
John Dewey, Historiography, and the Practice of History

by
Seth J. Bartee
John Dewey was America‟s foremost authority on many of the critical issues in the twentieth
century. Dewey dedicated his professional career as an expert on the major branches of
philosophy.
A neglected aspect of Dewey‟s philosophy is his writings on historiography, the philosophy of
history, and his influence on American historians. Dewey affected several generations of
historians from the Progressive historians to the practical realists of today.
This study evaluates Dewey‟s pragmatism as a legitimate strain in American historiography.
James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard claimed Dewey as an influence. Later historians such
as Richard Hofstadter and Joyce Appleby insist his methods make for more responsible-minded
historians.
There is enough material from American historians to assert that Dewey and Deweyan
pragmatism influenced and still impacts historians into the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1933, Charles Beard addressed the annual meeting of the American
Historical Association. Beard, a Progressive historian, put forth a thesis radical in nature for the
1930s. The American iconoclast said in, “Written History as an Act of Faith” that all history
writing was faith-based. “History is chaos and every attempt to interpret it otherwise is an
illusion,” said Beard to an audience in Urbana, Illinois.1 He had been one of America‟s most
daring historians, questioning the motives of the Founding Fathers in their reasons for drawing
up the Constitution. Near the end of Beard‟s career, he began to struggle with the economic
determinism. The fact that non-economic factors might have played a role in the Founders‟
decision to draft the Constitution had an insurmountable effect on Beard‟s thinking about
determinism‟s role in historical method.2 He let out his frustrations with his early work‟s short
comings and opted to embrace relativism as his methodology.
Fellow Progressive John Dewey took notice of his friend‟s change in behavior. Dewey
had worked beside Beard at Columbia. What disturbed Dewey about Beard‟s and other
historians‟ relativism was that it was not akin to scientific methods. Indeed, the Progressives
originally prided their movement because of its rational scientific method. Dewey answered
Beard and other relativists in 1938 in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Dewey had written about
history before on many occasions, but the few pages he dedicated to historical methodology in

1

Charles Beard, “Written History as an Act of Faith,” American Historical Review 39 (1934): 219-231.
Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington (New York: Vintage Books,
1970), 312-313. Traditional Marxists started to question the role of cultural factors on the proletariat. Beard was
no doubt, aware of this turn.
2
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his logic were critical of the profession. In those few short pages he asked critical questions
about the mode of historical research with precision and clarity. It is the contention of this thesis
that John Dewey had a profound impact upon the American historical profession. However,
Dewey‟s impact upon the field of history is largely ignored or forgotten altogether.
When John Dewey died in 1952, he stood out as America‟s most prominent public
intellectual.3 Dewey wrote about and influenced many issues of his day from the hyphenism
issue in race debates to how best to implement philosophy into factory workers‟ lives. In fact,
Dewey wrote such an extensive amount of material on such a wide variety of fields that it takes
up thirty-seven volumes. Additionally, five more volumes exist that contain his correspondence
and most essential writings.4 Unlike other influential thinkers whose voluminous writings are
forgotten with time, Dewey continues to spawn new followers as it seems that his pragmatism is
still relative today. Case in point: each year numerous secondary sources appear that credit
Dewey with a new insight.5
Nobody in academia today can match Dewey‟s popularity during his lifetime. Yet, there
are still parts of his philosophy that deserve further exploration. Dewey‟s philosophy of history is
one area that deserves further examination, not only because it has been neglected since shortly
after his death but also because many modern American historians consider pragmatism a
measuring rod for accuracy and fairness. Of the three American founders of pragmatism, John

3

Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), 819. Russell
considered Dr. Dewey, as he called him, America’s greatest philosopher.
4
Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Collected Works of John Dewey, 37 vols. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1967-1991); Larry Hickman, ed., The Correspondence of John Dewey, (Charlottesville, Va: Intelex
Corporation); Larry Hickman and Thomas M. Alexander, eds. The Essential Dewey (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1998).
5
Searching “John Dewey” on Project Muse, delivers more than one-thousand articles dealing with him.
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Dewey‟s legacy,6 next to William James, is the most profound. His popularity is yet another
reason to investigate the promise of pragmatism and how it relates to history.
Dewey writes that history is primarily an action also educative in nature. There is not a
better example of this than Dewey‟s use of history as a teaching tool during his tenure as a
Director at the University of Chicago‟s Laboratory School for children. Conclusively, the subject
matter for history, according to Dewey, is people. As Dewey saw it, people inhabit history;
people write history and are affected by the use or abuse of history. Consequently, Dewey
understood history to be a matter of human agency.
In order not to fall into the trap of crediting Dewey for something he did not intend, this
thesis will focus on his primary writings and those of his most influential students.7 Using this
approach will be sufficient, as Dewey wrote a prodigious amount about history and its
philosophy to bring together a coherent view of his historiography. Furthermore, the writing he
provided on history and about history in other subject matter demonstrates that he wielded
influence on American historians. No detailed evaluation of Dewey‟s historiography has been
attempted. Although he is credited with influence among historians during his era, he is at times
overshadowed by the arrival of Progressive historians. Presently, there is not a single major work
dedicated to Dewey‟s philosophy of history.
Today‟s historians who attempt a synthesis between accuracy and fairness can learn from
Dewey‟s insights into history. For the purpose of this thesis, four main schools of thought need
6

The term pragmatism is thrown about in a cavalier fashion. Unfortunately, pragmatism is defined
historically, instead of philosophically by most historians. There are different brands of pragmatism, hence its three
main founders. Dewey’s is the most accepted form, probably because he expounded his ideas the most during the
twentieth century.
7
Two of Dewey’s most influential students, who also wrote about his theory of history are, John Herman
Randall, Jr., and Sidney Hook. Hook, known as a Marx scholar, was Dewey’s most famous pupil. Both wrote on
Dewey’s philosophy, with Randall having written the most concise explanation of historical naturalism.
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discussion in conjunction with pragmatism. The first, cultural history, seeks to give human
agency prominence in history, instead of a strict structural approach that focuses on economics
and politics as prime factors in reasons for human action. A second major approach,
postmodernist history, tends to be inclined towards relativism with its focus on history‟s
partnership with powerful authorities such as the state. Although postmodern historiography
does not hold as prominent a position as it did in the 1970s, it nonetheless still garners
exceptional influence in debates, particularly in race and gender history. The third more general
school is the conservative approach represented by Russell Kirk in mid-century, Stephen Tonsor
and Eric Voegelin in the seventies, and current historians such as John Lukacs and Gertrude
Himmelfarb.8 Finally, the fourth school, the pragmatic school encompasses, historians such as
Richard Hofstadter, Margaret Jacob, Joyce Appleby, and Lynn Hunt who seek a more pragmatic
approach, (although Hunt regards herself as a new cultural historian) but do not necessarily
identify themselves as pragmatists or as followers of Dewey‟s philosophy.9 Although
pragmatism is not an acknowledged school of thought in contemporary historiography, it is
frequently praised for its value during periods of crisis in methodology.10 Dewey asked that
historians synthesize their methods for a more responsible approach. He proposes a humane
history in association with a usable past.
It is the contention of this thesis that Dewey intended to offer historians the chance to be
more logical and humane in their research. He put strong emphasis on methodology instead of on
a particular philosophy of history. Pigeonholing Dewey into the narrow genre of scientific
8

Kirk, although a PhD, practiced the profession outside of academia. Tonsor and Voegelin were both
academics who are regarded as unimportant outside of academic discourse. Lukacs and Roberts are considered to
be good historians, but they ignore modern debates in the field of history.
9
Lynn Hunt, ed., The New cultural history (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), passim.
10
Joyce Appleby and others, Telling the truth about history (New York: Norton, 1994). 283-291. In the final
chapter of Telling the Truth about History the authors defend a “pragmatic” stance in history as opposing
postmodernism. They are not the first historians to do so.
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historian, wielding his scientific method as a magic wand, is too constricted. His philosophy of
history is not easy to categorize. Dewey‟s version of pragmatism goes by four distinct names, all
essentially the same and yet also different. Instrumentalism is the most accepted version, which
is in essence pragmatism in action (method). The other three terms, naturalistic empiricism,
empirical naturalism, or naturalistic humanism are all interchangeable. The aforementioned
terms mean, for our purpose, that Dewey believed that progress is evident in the world around us
and traceable in history. From that he demonstrated that facts and most evidence could be
verified empirically. Dewey‟s empirical naturalism is methodologically based and a reaction to
the relativism and determinism of his era. Ironically, these labels only came to be used late in his
career.11
When Dewey wrote about the subject of history, he used this term in a fluid way. For
instance, as seen in Dewey‟s writings on education and epistemology, there are vital pieces to his
historical methodology linking his total picture collectively. It is important to remember that
Dewey‟s philosophy of history materializes in books about other subject matter. His philosophy
of history is not a philosophy per se but an action (method). Dewey may have imagined that
historians would one day join scientists by putting on lab coats in laboratory-like setting.
The second aspect of Dewey‟s history that is worth understanding is his appreciation for
a Hegelian vision of the unity of history. Dewey carries a permanent “Hegelian deposit” with
him throughout his career, as James Good posits in a recent work. The permanent mark of Hegel
surfaced in Dewey‟s desire for unity in history. Indeed, Dewey is one of the last analytic

11

For a reference point; Dewey’s later works period was from 1925 until his death in 1952. Dewey
scholars consider his later works to be his most mature phase. His middle works period lasted from 1899-1924. The
middle works period contains an abundant amount of material on history including his supposed break with neoHegelian philosophy.

10

philosophers of the twentieth century to believe in the usefulness of overarching philosophic
systems. However, during the First World War he claimed to have broken with Hegel outwardly,
but inwardly his years at Johns Hopkins as a graduate student under the training of many neoHegelians stayed with him for life.12
Finally, Dewey‟s philosophy is known for his unusual ability to combine academic rigor
with practical application. He expects nothing less of historians. Dewey asks historians to
consider applicability and method in their attempts to write responsible history. However, Dewey
is not out to demonstrate that his version of pragmatism is the best version for history. In lieu of
the relativism that he witnessed in Columbia‟s history department, and in his colleague Charles
Beard, Dewey felt that he had a duty to bring scientific method back into history. Dewey‟s
influence on American historiography deserves reconsideration because he was writing about
history during its move towards relativism and eventually the postmodern era. A revival of
pragmatism in the field of history in the 1980s makes his philosophy of history all the more
worthy of study now.13
The goal of this research is to understand more fully how Dewey‟s instrumentalist
version of pragmatism influenced historians during his lifetime and why it remains so significant
now. It is necessary to place Dewey‟s pragmatism into the context of modern historiographical
debates about whom “history” should include and the continuing debate about objectivity and the
use of documents in research.14 Indeed, Dewey was one of the first to question the Rankean

12

James A. Good, “John Dewey's "Permanent Hegelian Deposit" and the Exigencies of War,” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 44 (2006): 293-313.
13
James T. Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History: From Turner and Du Bois to Today,”
Metaphilosophy 35 (2004): 202-225.
14
Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: the "objectivity question" and the American historical profession
(Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 150-154. Novick reduces pragmatism’s role in
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belief in the supremacy of official documents. Consequently, he recognized a need for rationale
and logic in historical research.15 Not only did he question the process of research but also the
unscientific, and illogical, manner of fellow academic historians at work.16 When Dewey
discusses historiography, he is asking that historians perform as public intellectuals and as
scientists in a laboratory when performing research.

historiography to four short pages. He posits that pragmatism was nothing more than, “everyman his own
historian,” as Carl Becker titled his 1931 Presidential address to the American Historical Association.
15
John Dewey, John Dewey, “Historical Judgments,” in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, ed. Hans Meyerhoff,
The Philosophy of History in our Time: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), 163-173.
16
Dewey spent the majority of his mature career at Columbia. While there he worked next to influential
progressive historians Charles Beard and James Harvey Robinson. It is not an exaggeration to posit that Dewey’s
influence on academics in other fields, especially history, was real.

12

CHAPTER 2
DEWEY‟S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

John Dewey‟s instrumentalist version of pragmatism has had the most influence on
American historians and their methodologies. Dewey‟s theory of inquiry emphasizes scientific
thinking, a wide scope to borrow from the best points of view, as well as responsibility in
research methods. Twentieth-century historians took notice of Dewey because he made historical
inquiry clear and logical. One of the first historians to recognize the benefits of Dewey‟s
pragmatism for historical method was James Harvey Robinson. Robinson published his
groundbreaking The New History in 1912. In it, he seeks to make history scientific and usable.
Robinson, a colleague of Dewey‟s at Columbia, first recognized Dewey‟s genius before the First
World War.17
James Harvey Robinson was the first historian to attempt writing history with overt
pragmatic undertones. Robinson had been a student of William James at Harvard, so he was
familiar with the different strains of pragmatism. He, like Dewey, began to look at Hegelian/
structural history skeptically because it was rooted in mysticism of the absolute idea.18 As a
historian Robinson‟s intellectual growth reflected the same path of his Progressive philosopher
colleagues. He was reared in a religious home, influenced by Hegelian philosophy in college,
only to turn away soon after graduation and time spent with Harvard pragmatist William James.
Robinson was one of the most influential voices of the New History that emerged out of
urban centers after 1910. The New History was invariably rooted in pragmatic philosophy. “Very
17

Dewey published extensively in 1916 when both Democracy and Education and Essays in Experimental
Logic appeared.
18
Harvey Wish, introduction to Robinson The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical
Outlook, by James Harvey Robinson (New York: The Free Press, 1965), viii.
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important for the New History was the idea that modern history, enriched by an all-inclusive
subject matter, should be taught for the purpose of understanding the great problems of the
present,” wrote Harvey Wish in the 1940 introduction to Robinson‟s classic.19 Ironically, Charles
Beard was a student of Robinson‟s. Beard, of course, would become famous for his thesis that
economics was the reason for the drafting of the United States Constitution. Progressive
historians began to enter a crisis when deterministic answers to historical questions were not
enough to account for factors such as human agency. It was hero laden and out-of-date with antihistorical tendencies of progressive America.20
In 1912, Robinson admitted that historians carried biases into their research and writing.
It was a bold statement for an academic professional. As luck would have it, this occurred the
same year that former president Theodore Roosevelt was elected president of the American
Historical Association. In his speech to the annual meeting of the AHA, “History as Literature,”
Roosevelt lamented the overspecialization of science and literature. Roosevelt favored a
synthesis between poetry and science. “Because history, science, and literature have all become
specialized, the theory now is that science is definitely severed from literature and that history
must follow suit,” Roosevelt said. “Not only do I refuse to accept this as true for history but I do
not even accept it as true for science.”21 Although a trust-busting liberal for all intents and
purposes, Roosevelt gave a conservative speech on historical writing. In this atmosphere of 1912
Robinson, however, questioned the need for poetry in history because he did not feel that its
benefits were necessary to write fair history.

19

Harvey Wish, introduction to The New History, xi.
It was not a coincidence that American historians of the progressive era were so political. Past American
historians concentrated much time and effort on building great structures for diplomatic history and “great”
political figures, i.e., the founding fathers.
21
Theodore Roosevelt, “History as Literature,” American Historical Review 18 (1913): 473-489.
20
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Robinson‟s New History cited Dewey only three times. However, he clearly owed Dewey
a great debt for his thoughts on history. Chapter five is titled “History for the Common Man,”
which is a recurring theme in Dewey‟s books and his own thought about history‟s debt to people.
Near the conclusion of his essay on The New History, Robinson wrote, “It [history] will come in
time conspicuously to meet our daily needs.”22 Robinson explicitly rebutted the historians who
would synthesize myth with actual history. Robinson believed it was not fair or responsible. He
wanted to win history to science and take it away from the Whig historians. Robinson‟s attitude
towards history reflected that of his fellow progressive historians such as Frederick Jackson
Turner. Turner, like Robinson, felt that Whig historians did not incorporate enough science into
their methodology.
Frederick Jackson Turner‟s frontier thesis became a hallmark for pragmatic history as
well. Turner flipped history on its head when he said that geography determined important
historical patterns more than ideas and politics. Turner sounded a lot like Charles Beard, who
had written that economics was the main factor for the founding fathers when they drafted the
U.S. Constitution. Beard and Turner, both progressive historians, knew Dewey, with Beard his
colleague at Columbia. Both historians experimented with different types of historical inquiry as
opposed to the more conservative notion of strict archival research. For this purpose I will not
expound further on the experimental aspects of the research of Beard and Turner; it is sufficient
to say that Dewey‟s inquiry uses experimentation in method similar to the Progressive historians.
It might, at another time, give insight to the progressive‟s apparent iconoclastic notions in
history.

22

Robinson, The New History, 24.
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Turner‟s 1910 speech to the American Historical Association echoed Dewey‟s call for
stricter and new inquiry into an American that was rapidly changing:
Those who insist that history is simply the effort to tell the thing exactly as it was, to state
the facts, are confronted with the difficulty that the fact which they would represent is not
planted on the solid ground of fixed conditions; it is in the midst and is itself a part of the
changing currents, the interacting influences of the time, deriving its significance as a fact
from its relations to the deeper-seated movements of the age, movements so gradual that
often only the passing years can reveal the truth about the fact and its right to a place on
the historian's page.23
This dissatisfaction with the fact-based Rankean method is evident as society changed
and historians changed too. Beard, in the first chapter of An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, writes, “The Third School of historical research is not to be
characterized by any phrase. It is marked rather by an absence of hypotheses. It represents,
seeing the many pitfalls which beset the way of earlier writers, have resolutely turned aside from
„interpretation‟ in the larger sense, and concerned themselves with critical editions of the
documents and with the „impartial‟ presentation of related facts.”24 The Progressive school of
historians was more pragmatic and more likely to include people in research than past
generations of historians. For Beard and Turner, serious scientific inquiry was absent from
traditional explanations of structurally-minded historians. Human agency was more present in
history than the traditional historians wanted to admit.

23

Novick, That Noble Dream, 103.
Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1921), 3.
24
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Several historians who adhered to Dewey‟s instrumentalism followed the Progressive
historians and were more adamant about their need for human agency in history. Mary Beard, the
wife of Charles Beard, was committed to pragmatic history principles of research. Her first two
books, Women in Municipalities and A Short History of the American Labor Movement,
illustrated her commitment to the instrumental, perspectival, and revisionist nature of history.25
Another admirer and outspoken follower of Dewey‟s pragmatism was Merle Curti. He recounted
his debt to Dewey‟s 1916 classic Democracy and Education. Curti said Democracy and
Education showed him that historical study‟s purpose was to show the growth of human
cooperation.26 However, a gap existed between first-generation followers of Dewey and secondgeneration pragmatists such as Curti. According to James Kloppenberg, “Whereas the generation
of Robinson, Becker, and the Beards, the generation of Curti‟s teachers, had introduced
historians to perspectivalism, fallibilism, and instrumentalism, Curti and his generation used
pragmatism not only as an important source of ideas but also as an important object of study.”27
Interestingly, Curti and Beard cooperated on a project, “Propositions in Historiography,” that
based its tenets on pragmatism, mostly Dewey‟s instrumentalism.28 The report is important
because it states pragmatism‟s relevance to modern historiography.
Dewey‟s influence did not end with Curti. Henry Steele Commager, Richard Hofstadter,
David Hollinger, Joyce Appleby, and Morton White are some of the seminal historians who have
either used Dewey‟s method or incorporated pragmatism into their research. The list of historians
under the influence of Deweyan pragmatism could go on, but it is far too extensive for this thesis
to encompass fully. Since the focus of this thesis is to show that Dewey influenced and continues
25

Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History,” 223.
Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History,” 223.
27
Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History,” 223.
28
Kloppenberg, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History,” 208.
26
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to influence several generations of historians, it is necessary to understand why Deweyan
pragmatism is still valuable decades after Dewey‟s death.
Dewey‟s Philosophy of History

Dewey concentrated most of his academic career on the branch of philosophy known as
epistemology.29 He was also concerned with metaphysics and how it interacted with humans‟
epistemic functions. Dewey thought history needed an epistemological checkup. He did not want
historians to concentrate on eternal unchanging beings but to look for answers in the present. His
epistemology is probably most associated with naturalistic epistemology.30 In order to
understand Dewey‟s philosophy of history, we must define pragmatism for Dewey first and then
continue to the intricacies of his historiography.
Dewey‟s definition of pragmatism is fundamental for a proper understanding of his view
of history. For Dewey, history is both a way to understand humans and an act to present the
problems of men in a logical fashion. In The Growth of the American Mind, Merle Curti explains
that Dewey‟s theory of knowledge is a “public function…emphasizing the unfinished character
of society.”31 Dewey‟s theory of history adheres to this naturalistic function, but it is still very
human in its emphasis. However, pragmatism‟s definition was different for the three founders of
pragmatic philosophy. Dewey‟s is more pluralistic; Jamesian pragmatism is monistic in nature
and more foundationalist than Dewey; and Royce‟s more individualistic and metaphysical in
nature than Dewey. Philip Jackson writes that the term pragmatism means “looking upon the
29

Joseph L. Blau, “John Dewey’s Theory of History,” The Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960): 93. Blau quoted a
line out of Wesley C. Clark’s letters about Dewey that said that all of Dewey’s class’s deal with “how we think.”
30
Chase B. Wrenn, “Naturalistic Epistemology,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/nat-epis.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
31
Merle Curti, Growth of American thought, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 548. The emphasis is on the
organic nature of Dewey’s system.
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consequences of any proposition as a necessary test of its validity, provided, of course, that those
consequences are not just imagined but are the results of actions taken in accordance with the
proposition itself.”32 Jackson compares this sequence as making the proposition that the cat is on
the mat and then finding the cat. Pragmatism is a philosophy of results. It does not abhor the
contemplative act of philosophizing. Pragmatism does not dwell on abstractions; at least
Deweyan pragmatism does not. More importantly, pragmatists do not seek to implement,
abstract ideas into society or into history method.33 Dewey wrote that “the term „pragmatic‟
means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to consequences for
final meaning.”34 Jackson expounds upon Dewey‟s definition adding that pragmatism is a way of
employing knowledge for the betterment of mankind. “Pragmatism is content to take its stand
with science,” Dewey wrote. “it also takes it stand with daily life.”35
The first critique Dewey put forth about history was its irrational elevation of ideas he
believed found its way into the interpretation of archival documents. “The witness of history is
that to think in general and abstract terms is dangerous,” Dewey writes. “It elevates ideas beyond
the situations in which they were born and charges them with we know not what menace for the
future.”36 Dewey in particular related this to German historians leading up to the First World
War. He blamed Hegelian historiography for its abstract theorizing that lead to totalitarianism
through nationalistic historians. Dewey‟s response was that history should rely on the scientific
method.
32

Philip W. Jackson, “John Dewey,” in The Companion to Pragmatism, ed. John R. Shook and Joseph
Margolis (Malden, MA.: Blackwell), 59. Jackson’s definition is Deweyan with its focus on consequences, validity,
and results.
33
This does not mean that pragmatism does not hearken back to idealistic assumptions. Dewey is not a
relativist, but he disdained the romanticism of history and philosophy for philosophy’s sake.
34
Jackson, “John Dewey,” in The Companion to Pragmatism, 60.
35
Jackson, “John Dewey,” in The Companion to Pragmatism, 60.
36
John Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics (New York, H. Holt, 1915), 12.
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According to Dewey, history had been unscientific because human agency was not taken
seriously before the progressive historians.37 In Dewey‟s famous work, Logic: The Theory of
Inquiry, he asks if it is possible for history to be more like science.38 He means by “scientific” a
way of understanding history through experimentalism and evolutionary naturalism. Before
writing Logic, Dewey grounded his philosophy of history in democracy and education first in
1916.
Dewey gives us an important view into his philosophy of history in Democracy and
Education. In this well-known 1916 book, Dewey shows where historical thinking fits into his
philosophy. Consequently, the framework he lays out for history is similar to that in his Logic
twenty-two years later. Dewey fits history into an overall framework that is democratic and
educative; whereas in Logic he puts history into a logical framework. Democracy and Education
is Dewey‟s introduction to his philosophy of education. In twenty-six chapters he puts forward a
plan for education, that is, of course, democratic. The sixteenth chapter is titled “The
Significance of Geography and History.”39 Here he sets the foundation of history on democracy
and asks that education form the centrality of historical method.
Ironically, this Dewey sounds like the Dewey we meet in Logic two decades later. In
Democracy and Education Dewey writes that history is important because it gives information
and background on subject matter that is otherwise meaningless.40 Unlike many philosophers of
his day, Dewey believed history could shed light on the practicality of philosophy and not the
37
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other way around. History is the starting point. It is the place where knowledge begins and where
the democratic progress starts. Consequently, Dewey‟s words are far-reaching because he thinks
like a philosopher but uses historical methods. He puts forth a radical claim in acknowledging a
knowable past, one that provides a base for a democratic structure.
Connectivity and Illumination
Dewey writes that, „“to learn history”‟ is to gain knowledge and to recognize its human
connections.”41 This connectedness Dewey so frequently refers to is a part of the illuminating
factor of history. History illuminates “our own customs and institutions.”42 History is a function
of the present; to be present-minded, to have historical knowledge, and is to shed light on human
institutions. However, Dewey poses that there is a limit to illumination in history.
When history becomes a function of the literary imagination then illumination ceases. 43
Dewey says that literary history does not illuminate the present, because “in purely literary
history the natural environment is but stage scenery.”44 Knowledge and democracy stop when
abstraction is brought into history. The progress of history is natural and the expectation is that
the research should match the progress of humans. Dewey elucidates further, “When this social
aim is overlooked, however, the study of primitive life becomes simply a rehearsing of
sensational and exciting features of savagery.”45
The final part of history that Dewey explores in Democracy and Education is the role of
morality in historical study. He concludes that history is not itself moral, but illumination of
41
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events in history is a moral act. The writing act of history is not necessarily moral, although the
case can be made from Dewey‟s aforementioned statements that it can be seen as a moral act.
According to Dewey, history reveals that people have made evolutionary progress; furthermore
this is a moral fact of history. This is dependent upon “intellectual discoveries and inventions,
and the extent to which the things which ordinarily figures most largely in historical writings
have been side issues, or even obstructions for intelligence to overcome.”46 When progress and
illumination are ignored, errors of interpretation happen, and Beard‟s “history as actuality”
becomes fact then this is not moral history. Dewey summarizes his chapter on history stating that
history enhances connectedness and experience and it enhances direct experience thus enhancing
the present.
Dewey was concerned enough about history to step outside of his primary field to
critique it. It was unusual for a philosopher to do so then and it is now. Ultimately, Dewey
questioned the traditional foundations of historical methodology. Whereas historians of the
Rankean era and the first generation of professional American historians posited that their
research was done in the only manner they were familiar with, in archives, Dewey believed this
was not scientific enough. Dewey knew there were other elements that determine how people
act, such as is in evidenced in Turner‟s frontier thesis. Dewey felt that traditional historians with
their nationalistic tendencies and reliance on official documents misunderstood the notion of
human progress and connectivity. Dewey‟s problem with documents is that this kind of evidence
does not necessarily shed light on the present, and its presentation can fall into the category of
literary history because historians interpret the document for the reader.
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Initially, Dewey challenges the validity of historical documentation by asking who was
translating the documents. Of course, documentary research is necessary, and it is a necessary
part of the function of historians. Coincidently, while Dewey is exploring the limits and scope of
documentary research, two of the field‟s most widely read historians were near simultaneously
penning their most important works on world history.47 Dewey allows for the validity of oral
history, traditions, legends, and so on, but he asks how the historian chooses which evidence to
use and if it is valid. 48 Yet again, he says the use of oral history and traditions falls into the genre
of literary imagination. Whereas scientists use the same methods of research, he openly reveals
concern that historians do not have the same safeguards. He supposes that modern historiography
is somewhat scientific but doubts that each historian abides by the same standards of research,
instead looking more like novelists.
“The formation of historical judgments lags behind that of physical judgments not only
because of greater complexity and scantiness of the data, but also because to a large extent
historians have not developed the habit of stating to themselves and to the public the systematic
conceptual structures which they employ in organizing their data to anything like the extent in
which the physical inquirers expose their conceptual framework,” Dewey writes in Logic.49 Once
more, connectivity and relation to the public are stated as goals for historians. In a somewhat
famous argument with Reinhold Niebuhr about a philosophy of history, Dewey gives us a
definition of what a philosophy of history is. “He (Niebuhr) engages in long range views and
47
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predictions,” Dewey writes. “He seems to me to predicate political policies for the present upon
a conception of what the future is practically sure to be.”50 What he is seeking to show is that the
field of history must come to a conclusion regarding methodology. Accordingly, he defines a
philosophy of history as a negative function among historians. He finalizes his essay Unity and
Progress calling for unity in the profession for the benefit of the present. Lastly, he criticizes
Niebuhr for placing a structural/deterministic view of history on historiography.

Dewey Tackles Human Agency

The act of historical research in Dewey‟s mind is a collective process that begins with
criticism and finalizes with knowing. He is not so naïve as he realizes all historians differ in
research, but not so much that, consensus and unity are not impossible. “We must doubtless, in
any case, find our way experimentally,” Dewey says.51 Dewey is one of the forerunners to the
movement that called for a climate of a synthesis between objectivity and subjectivity. He wants
historians to use science and regard events as the principle methods in the retelling of history.52
In What I Believe, he writes of his belief in the ability of science and the scientific method to
save people from abstractions.53 Abstraction does not unify or illuminate institutions and
therefore does not serve the human good.
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The problems of people were central to Dewey and his followers. Dewey is not
concerned as much with historical accuracy as he is finding a way to work in the confines to
reach for accuracy in the field of history. The process of research is a part of a democratic way of
thinking about history and research. Consequently, it is a moral play between historian, student,
and reader. Dewey says that pragmatism is mostly moral and this is part of its long-lasting
appeal. He adds that pragmatism is more humane than its European predecessors because of its
apparent respect for humanity.54
It seems obvious the teleology is not a major topic of discussion for Dewey for several
reasons. Dewey echoed contemporary and historian Eric Voegelin in that teleology and
eschatology in historical thinking actually drive people to rationalize totalitarian ways of
thinking about history.55 Antithetically, instrumentalism is a method that makes judgment clearer
without going into the deeper prospects of teleology and eschatology. Dewey explains that the
philosophy in history is like using a crystal ball and predicting political fixes.56 His concern is
not people‟s destiny but how they live in the present day. He leaves destiny in history to moral
philosophers and theologians. He will not place this burden on historians because their data are
not abstract or apt to philosophic contemplation.
George Santayana agrees with Dewey about the method of pragmatism and its conviction
that the philosophy of history is acting as if it owns the crystal ball with all the answers to the
future. Santayana relates this to German historical methods, which Dewey did in German
Philosophy and Politics. In The German Mind, Santayana writes that European thought,
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especially the German mind, is infected with a belief in cultural superiority because historians
justify it in the writing of history.57 Both Dewey and Santayana think that historians are
irresponsible with philosophy in cooperation with history. They, being from the First World
War-generation, naturally associate problems in historical method as a cause for German
totalitarianism, although, both men owe a great debt to European Continental philosophy because
of its impact on their philosophical thinking. Dewey addresses this apparent contradiction. In
Absolutism and Experientialism, he writes that he prefers the linear aspects of German history
but that the metaphysics is flawed.58 Dewey prefers a naturalistic metaphysics where history
moves towards human progress, connectivity, and interaction.
Historical Naturalism and Pragmatic Progressivism

In The Growth of the American Mind, Merle Curti writes that Dewey‟s brand of
pragmatism has its roots in Darwinian naturalism. Dewey thinks Darwin‟s evolutionary progress
is a friend to pragmatism and historical consciousness.59 According to Curti, Dewey‟s main
contribution to the American mind is his conception of a pragmatic theory of knowledge based
on naturalism.60 Dewey believes that people are always in a state of evolutionary progress and
this belief is prevalent in his philosophy of history. Of course, this brand of naturalism has its
roots in the Social Gospel which was so popular among Progressives of the early twentieth
century. However, Dewey did not support Social Darwinism. Dewey‟s naturalism is moral and
caring. His history is not nasty and brutish but is a picture of cooperation and movement towards
57
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truth, a sort of Socratic Method in history.61 The historian‟s responsibility is to facilitate this
atmosphere of cooperation, accuracy, and unity. Throughout the field of history in the 1930s
there was a movement to address the social role of the historian.
In his 1933 letter to the annual meeting of the American Historical Association,
Benedetto Croce wrote, “Good history writing…does not need to be invented, because it has
always existed in the world and has a long history of its own.” He goes on to echo Dewey in
writing, “But it is necessary constantly to redirect it and to breathe into it that energy which may
be equal to new demands.”62 Croce was attempting to restore history in Hegelian terms. In that
sense he reflected the pragmatism of William James because of its monistic tendencies.
However, Croce realized, as did Dewey, that historical relativism could become prevalent in an
age where knowledge is growing and society rapidly changing. Dewey‟s answer is that historians
must educate and realize that the goal is still progress and unity. In Dewey‟s later period the
message began to change from unity to responsibility. The older John Dewey believes that the
historian/educator is the guide for all of the students‟ social interaction.63 The question then
arises about how much responsibility the historian has to the public.
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CHAPTER 3

DEWEY‟S NEED FOR UNITY AND HIS HEGELIAN PERIOD

It is easy to misunderstand a great figure‟s coming-of-age. How did the scholar become
scholarly? Does Karl Marx‟s history tell us something different, even contradictory, about
Marxism? John Dewey is one such figure whose history is often misunderstood. Dewey did not
wake up one morning and develop the philosophy of pragmatism. He did not have a cogito
experience like Rene Descartes. Dewey‟s past proves that pragmatism was a process of
maturation for the native Vermonter. His genius developed over his 68-year academic career.
The best place to start researching the beginning of Dewey‟s career is his undergraduate days at
the University of Vermont. From there Dewey eventually earned a place for himself as a budding
intellectual in Baltimore under the influence of neo-Hegelian philosopher George Sylvester
Morris.64 This forgotten part of his intellectual development warrants further discussion to better
understand Dewey as a philosopher of history.
American higher education was undergoing change wrought by the nineteenth century
advances in science during Dewey‟s collegiate career. The separation between philosophy and
theology became more pronounced even if it showed commonly in books and not yet in
classrooms. Rapidly, the bedrocks of American Protestant education were eroded. Consequently,
this is the academic environment in which Dewey learned.
Already the analytic turn in the field of philosophy was evident in late nineteenth century
America. Furthermore, the analytic turn would lead to academic fragmentation and prove to be a
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death knell to systematic philosophy.65 Among American philosophical circles of the Gilded Age
several schools vied for supremacy. Scottish Realism and German Idealism were popular
intellectual movements after Reconstruction.66 Many American philosophers blended
Christianity with scientific philosophy in hope of a synthesis. They did this with some success
until the scientific method became mainstreamed during the Progressive era. Merle Curti writes,
“The most striking event in the intellectual history of the last third of the nineteenth century was
the blow dealt the historic doctrine of supernaturalism--the doctrine that a divine Creator stands
about the laws of nature and intervenes directly in natural events and the affairs of men through
miracles and the granting of grace-by new developments in the biological and physical
sciences.”67 The conflict of the late nineteenth century philosophy between science and
Christianity left a mark on Dewey‟s development. Dewey came to view evangelical forms of
Christianity as unscientific and challenged their methods of inquiry. Personally, Dewey‟s mother
was an evangelical Christian with progressive views.68 Although he abandoned Christianity, he
later saw its value as a foundation.
Dewey liked philosophy as an undergraduate and when he graduated from Vermont, he
continued to read philosophy in his spare time.69 He served as an assistant principal in
Pennsylvania before he decided to enroll in Johns Hopkins in 1882 as one of its first graduate
students. His professors were all scientific men who preferred to leave Christianity back in the
Middle Ages.70 George Sylvester Morris researched the philosophy of Hegel and Kant and
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influenced Dewey the most.71 He also studied with Charles Sanders Peirce, who is the founder of
pragmatism, and G. Stanley Hall who founded organized psychology in America. The
ascendency of science and psychology was thought to benefit theology because it revealed new
ways of knowing God. Instead, the new fields did the opposite and dethroned theology. It
became obvious that Darwin‟s science and story of origin was soon to overtake religious
explanations for the origin of the world and the life in it. This was an intellectual environment
that both challenged and shaped Dewey‟s mind.
Dewey began his career as a neo-Hegelian philosopher at Johns Hopkins before finally
discarding that mantra and developing the instrumentalist version of pragmatism at the
University of Chicago years later.72 While at Chicago, he began to shed his need for a systematic
philosophy, his Hegelianism; there he saw the value of practicality in the form of pragmatism.
When he discarded the intricacies of Hegelianism, he dismissed orthodox religion as well.73 In
1903 Morton White posited the original thesis that Dewey put Hegelianism behind him in
Studies in Logical Theory.74 James Good writes that this is not true: “Regardless of why the
traditional view was initially articulated, the issue of Dewey's debt to Hegel continues to
beleaguer Dewey scholars partly because, in 1930, he acknowledged „Hegel ha[d] left a
permanent deposit in [his] thinking.‟”
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The Hegelian period and permanent Hegelian deposit cannot be dismissed in Dewey‟s
career; this is because history is of the utmost importance to Hegelian philosophy.75 Since history
is key to Hegelianism, that meant Dewey had to consider history in correlation to his dedication
to Hegelian idealism. As a young philosopher in graduate school, Dewey found Hegel to be
useful. Hegel represented the best trends in German philosophy nearing the twentieth century; he
was not overly orthodox or absolutely scientific. Put succinctly, “The contents of philosophical
knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of
contemporary culture,” as Paul Redding writes of Hegelianism.76 In nineteenth-century thought
there was not a yet a confirmed logical contradiction in the need for the progress of science and
the unity that metaphysics provided. Dewey would later find problems not necessarily with
Hegel‟s systematized philosophy, but with his loose use of Christianity that appeared to be old
fashioned and illiberal after the First World War. Hegel, whose philosophy was all but docile in
Germany until later in the twentieth century, proved to be excessively dictatorial and
metaphysical for someone who was a progressive and believed in democracy.77
Hegel‟s influence over Dewey is immense and several authors assert that Dewey never
escaped the influence of Hegel‟s systemization and unity of knowledge.78 Hegel‟s philosophy
provided Americans a way to embrace religion, a sense of citizenship, science, and a sense that
all of those were cooperative in essence. Ironically, Hegel‟s system was so broad and
encompassing that both traditionalists and liberals found commonalities in Hegel.79 As a result,
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to be a Hegelian was not unusual entering the twentieth century.80 Many progressives decided
that Hegelianism was a sufficient foundation to build on for reasons mentioned previously.
Hegel seems outdated in today‟s postmodern environment. He believed in Church, God,
the State, and metaphysics. Furthermore, before the First World War and primarily before the
start of the twentieth century, American scholars studied in Germany and earned PhDs from
Germany institutions.81 Ironically, Dewey enrolled in the first PhD program offered in the United
States. He mirrored other young philosophers in the late nineteenth-century United States. He
grew up in a religious environment and it proved to be a foundation and structure for Dewey‟s
philosophy.82 Neil Coughlan writes that Dewey early in his career was caught up between a
desire for religiosity and the yearnings for a new form of scientific understanding.83 Hegel
provided a way to be both religious and seek a greater understanding through reason. Of course,
the absolute idea was interpreted by various sects of Hegelians to mean different things. For
Dewey, Hegelianism equaled a balance between reason, science, and religiosity.84
A reason that history is so important to Dewey is because it was a seminal part of Hegel‟s
philosophy. Yet, during the First World War, Dewey began to question the idea of historical
thinking in Hegel‟s philosophy. By the time the First World War began Dewey was no longer a
new academic. He was an established, published, and honored professor, and in 1916 he
published Democracy and Education which is considered his most seminal statement on his
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philosophy until that point. No one is sure how he felt about Hegel at this juncture, but according
to his book Germany Philosophy and Politics, he used the First World War to question what he
saw as a relationship between German arrogance and Hegelian philosophy. Dewey supported
America‟s entrance into the First World War. He held that Germany overstepped its boundaries.
As a philosopher he took Germany‟s aggression on a personal level and likewise derided it from
a philosophical and political stance.

Challenging the European Model of History

There is evidence that Dewey began to question the European model of history as early
as the 1890s. This is not unique of Dewey; critic and counterpart George Santayana also felt the
Germans and Continental philosophy in general had an ego problem.85 In German Philosophy
and Politics, Dewey writes that he does not believe that ideas are behind man‟s every action.86
He is reacting to what he saw as the German will to power that was fueled, in his opinion, by the
attachment to ideas instead of practicality. He concluded German Philosophy and Politics when
he wrote that America needed an experimental method in history. “An American philosophy of
history must perforce be a philosophy for its future, future in which freedom and fullness of
human companionship is the aim, and intelligent cooperative experimentation the method,”
Dewey writes.87 In this definitive statement Dewey has made a distinction between
European/Continental history and American history. The lack of practicality in history, Dewey
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believed, can lead to arrogance and, as a result, to war. Santayana agrees with Dewey when he
accuses Hegel, Kant, and Schiller as driving Germany to commit itself to will of global power
both militarily and intellectually.88 During the First World War American intellectuals began to
question the legacy of German/Continental philosophy in America. Dewey led the chorus when
he wrote, “I do not believe, then, that pure ideas, or pure thought, ever exercised any influence
upon human action.”89 His condemnation of Europe and philosophers of history set him up to
develop a pragmatic philosophy of history.
Although the term “pragmatism” was in use long before the First World War, it did not
catch on in mainstream academic circles until the conclusion of the First World War.90
Pragmatism, while it grew in popularity, was not without its ardent critics. Joseph L. Blau
contended that pragmatism evolved into a purely American philosophy but found its roots in
British Empiricism.91 Blau insisted, similar to Arthur Lovejoy, that pragmatism is a patchwork of
different philosophies. He thought that John Stuart Mill set forth the same king of arguments
found in pragmatism such as the limits of morality and the need for rational inquiry.92
Nevertheless, Lovejoy sought to show before Blau in The Thirteen Pragmatisms that pragmatism
lacks a serious foundation.93 These critics struggled with the idea that philosophy could be
practical and offer itself to answer so many problems.

88

Santayana, The German Mind, 7.
Dewey, German philosophy, 7.
90
Menand, Metaphysical Club, 337-338.
91
Joseph L. Blau, Men and movements in American Philosophy, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952), 228-273.
Blau writes that Americans first borrowed from British Empiricism to create pragmatism.
92
Colin Heydt, “John Stuart Mill: Overview,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/milljs.htm (accessed 9 October 2008).
93
Arthur Lovejoy, The great chain of being: a study of the history of an idea: the William James lectures
delivered at Harvard University, 1933, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1964), passim. Lovejoy posits
that all ideas follow a great chain from ancient history to the present.
89

34

For many critics of the progressive era this was enough to write pragmatism off as
another intellectual episode with its roots in late nineteenth-century America. The
Americanization of British Empiricism was a stalwart effort from pragmatists such as John
Dewey to separate the United States from European Continental philosophy, so the critic‟s story
goes. Truly, Dewey and the pragmatists were not bound to Europe in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries like their predecessors. The Vermonter recognized that America at the end of
the nineteenth century was on the brink of not only military greatness, separateness, but a new
way of understanding the world and indeed breaking the traditional bounds of European
philosophy that often to led to militarism. Europe, in Santayana and Dewey‟s eyes, still reeked of
aristocracy and Whig notions about traditionalism and those things that no longer belonged in the
twentieth century Dewey thought. In Dewey‟s eyes, Germany‟s rigid attachment to abstract
philosophy allowed the state to force people to choose between absolutes.
Dewey had a keen sense of understanding about the United States in the progressive era.
He witnessed American success on a large scale during his lifetime and especially in his mature
career. In 1898 the U.S. succeeded in subduing Spain in Cuba, a decade later the U.S. controlled
the Panama Canal and was dealing with domestic problems rapidly beginning with anti-trust
laws, unions, poverty, prohibition, and women‟s rights; the U.S. was unequaled in its path
towards democracy during Dewey‟s lifetime. Dewey and the pragmatists realized that there was
not a European tradition to turn to anymore that addressed these issues. On the other side of the
Atlantic the Europeans were still warring over heritage and aristocracy. The whole plethora of
domestic political and social events, combined with America‟s ever-growing role internationally,
greatly affected how Dewey thought about philosophy. These changes revealed to Dewey that
America should strive to be self sufficient.
35

Despite shedding his Hegelian roots, history plays a very active role within Dewey‟s
pragmatic method. Dewey did not hate Europe, but he thought it impractical and outdated in the
new environment of the twentieth century.94 Europe was bloated with aristocracies that warred
over land and other issues. A divide was apparent to him after the First World War. As far as
John Dewey could see, industrialism, military might, and geography had separated the U.S. from
Europe.95 The industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and Andrew Carnegie
were boosting the Americans far ahead of European production at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Differing from Morgan, both Carnegie and Rockefeller rose through the business world
from the lower classes. Tradition‟s role in history was changing as wealth, invention, and
education changed the ranks of the middle class. The idea of an established aristocratic method
(Rankean historiography) was abhorrent to Dewey and the pragmatists. The tide of
historiography changed as Dewey took history out of the realm of professional historians into the
realm of the educator and the working man.
Dewey‟s Dilemma with Rankean History

Dewey was troubled about Rankean history for three main reasons. The first is its
methods of document choice, the second is that it is overtly nationalistic, and finally because it is
only concerned with the large characters of history. Dewey is concerned about the “working
man” in history. This does not mean that he was denigrating history or lowering the expectations.
He was concerned about human agency and the ability of historians to write about culture in their
research.
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Dewey believed that history was of value because it could help us better understand
institutions. If used correctly, history would show that progress is inevitable. “It is justifiable to
say without dogmatism that both anthropology and history give support to those who wish to
change these institutions,” he wrote in his essay “Human Nature.” 96 He understood the path
could prove to be like a ladder for proper institutional reforms. Dewey had convincing to do with
his fellow academics.97 Historians were not ready to concede that Rankean historiography was
invalid and that the common man played an important role in history, and that historians needed
to be responsible in dealing with human agency. Dewey thought that academics were only
nominally successful in emanating ideas to the general public of America. The other part of
America, the largest part, America‟s workers took their ideas not from academic professionals
but mostly from popular periodicals, local educators, teachers, and similar sources. Ironically,
Dewey understood this and wrote a great deal about education and history. The educative aspect
of history served as a humanistic element in democracy Dewey thought.
John Dewey‟s role in historical thinking in America takes place in the negotiation
between the professional philosopher, the historian, and the worker. Dewey agreed that the
traditionalist model for history needed to be balanced with an understanding of Darwinian
evolution.98 Growth and evolution take place in institutions and history needs to provide the
material to use for reform. Dewey saw America as place where Darwinian evolution could take
hold in the sciences and the arts in order to explain gradual changes99 and historical changes, too.
The maelstrom in Europe did not require more idealists and historians of high tragedy but
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thinkers who are willing to get “dirty” and discover and how the point of war was reached.
Dewey began to question how modernity fueled the loss of personhood despite the many
political and technical advances.100 The great problem in modernity and history was how to
process the effects of science and the loss of self. Dewey posited that practicality was the
answer; do not professionalize but personalize. Make history less rigid and temper the tendency
against historicism at the same time.
Literature on Dewey‟s Theory of History

Literature on Dewey is abundant, with the exception being his philosophy of history. He
is written about in parts of many books on historiography. The existing literature is
predominately about Dewey‟s Hegelian period, or it explores his influence on the Progressive
historians. During anniversaries of Dewey‟s birth or death more appears about his philosophy of
history in spurts. More often than not, the subject of his historical methodology is dormant. This
section will focus on what is written about his philosophy of history and summarize each article
and book available.
Burleigh Taylor Wilkins and Joseph L. Blau were the two most important thinkers who
first studied Dewey‟s historiography. Wilkins focuses on Dewey‟s lifelong relationship with
Hegelianism.101 He highlights Dewey‟s continuous flirtation with Hegelianism writing that,
“Dewey, while sharing James‟s high esteem for thinking beings, conspicuously did not share
James‟s love of Pluralism and the Incomplete” about Dewey‟s persistent need for unity.102
Wilkins maintains that Dewey never left behind his love for monism in the form of Hegelianism.
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Wilkins‟ points out that since most of the pragmatists were born in the middle 1800s, those
thinkers could not have grown into their intellectual selves as pragmatists. The author of this
article holds that these thinkers, especially Dewey, grew up under the influence of more
traditional ideas, i.e., they were grounded in metaphysics.103 Wilkins thesis is to show that the
center of pragmatic thought is brought together by two different strands in Western thinking. The
first is Jamesian, which is pluralist, and the second is Dewey‟s, which he says in monistic and
complete. Wilkins ultimate goal is to tie Dewey to Hegel and prove the Dewey‟s version of
pragmatism is not really that novel.
Wilkins quotes Dewey as late as 1930 claiming that Hegel left a “permanent deposit” in
his philosophy.104 Wilkins uses this to claim that British Empiricism, evolutionary experimental
science, and Hegelian idealism are the roots of pragmatism. Throughout Dewey‟s career he used
Hegel as a way to hang onto liberal Christianity and stress the importance of mind and matter
together. Wilkins is attempting to show that Dewey wanted completeness in his thinking system,
separating him somewhat from the later modernists. Dewey later outwardly rejected Hegel‟s
idealism on the basis of its roots in German militarism as he saw during the First World War.
Wilkins followed his initial article up with another focusing on the historical inquiry of
pragmatism.105 Wilkins thesis is that history was a large part of pragmatism and that Dewey used
it frequently in philosophizing. He aims to prove that Dewey‟s history is a logic of science.
According to Wilkins, Dewey‟s history is logic and unity of science instead of tracing past
events. “The question,” he (Dewey) believed, “is not so much whether or not history in the large
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is a science, or even whether or not it is capable of becoming a science. It is whether the
procedures employed by historians are precluded from having scientific quality,” Wilkins quotes
Dewey writing in his logic.106 Dewey is concerned more with the logic in which history is
written and how the present affects the writing of the past according to Wilkins. Wilkins
correctly critiques Dewey‟s historical methodology suggesting that Dewey believes that all
historical inquiry is not about the past but the present.107 Wilkins continues writing that the
permanent Hegelian deposit in Dewey‟s thought blinds him to the accuracy history gained in the
twentieth century. Wilkins does not successfully fend off Dewey‟s criticism by saying that if
historical inquiry cannot be done that we leave history to mythmakers. Dewey did not devalue
history, but rather he asked that history be more logical.
Joseph L. Blau in his article, “John Dewey‟s Theory of History,” maintains that Williams
James showed Dewey “how to use the new evolutionary currents of thought as a way of
reinstating man‟s mental activities in nature.”108 Blau shows that Dewey thinks ideas served a
utilitarian purpose in society. Dewey‟s founding of the “Chicago School” of pragmatism was
intent on reformulating the method of the history of ideas.109 Blau suggested that there are two
strains in Dewey‟s thinking about history. He says that Dewey‟s thought is founded upon an
organic evolutionary process (historical) of how things change, the second affected by his study
of James is concerned with how change can be directed.110 The most important statement Blau
makes about Dewey, and one that this thesis holds, is that Dewey is not primarily concerned with
the transcendental, but with the temporal order of human things. According to the author this is
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not contradictory with historical knowledge in that “experimentalism” allows for cooperation
with the past. The historian in Dewey‟s eyes is a scientist. A scientist gathering information is
just the first part of the work, the next is experimentation.111 This definitely runs contrary with
the idea of Rankean and traditional nineteenth-century historiography which is nonexperimental. Blau asserts that history plays the role of facilitator in the process of naturalism.
Dewey reiterates that the scientific nature of Dewey‟s historical inquiry cannot be removed from
the process. “Historical inquiry is to be distinguished from scientific inquiry by its subject
matter, not its methods,” Blau claims.112 Blau‟s is the seminal piece on Dewey‟s philosophy of
history; sadly little has been done to equal it.113
Eugene Provenzo attempts to extrapolate a theory of history from Dewey‟s time at the
University of Chicago‟s laboratory school. Provenzo researches Dewey‟s history in action,
writing that for Dewey events and chronicle are separated from history as eventual.114 Provenzo
writes that Dewey uses history as scientific inquiry. Through this Dewey aimed to recreate a
society on experimentalism. Provenzo sums up his article writing, “Dewey was not interested in
making history a story of battles and dynasties. Instead, he stressed its usefulness as an analytic
tool, a means through which children could, by tracing its historical origins and development,
gain insight into the principles and complexities of their own society.”115 To bolster his thesis he
shows that Dewey believed students were not interested in old history, but in how history
showed scientific change in society. Provenzo, who is not a historian, helps us to see how
Dewey‟s historical methodology is also central to his pragmatism in general.
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R. Jack Wilson writes that Dewey‟s Hegelianism is not a major influence on the
philosopher‟s thoughts. In a review of William Goetzmann‟s The American Hegelians, Wilson
writes that Hegelianism was a short-lived phenomenon in not only Dewey‟s intellectual life but
among the American intelligentsia in general.116 In a scathing review of Goetzmann‟s
monograph, Wilson ignores Wilkins thesis that Hegelians were dominant before the First World
War. He says that Hegel‟s influence in the States was, “odd, obscure, and doubtful.”117 In more
than one instance the reviewer chides Goetzmann, the editor of American Hegelians, for puffing
up the Hegelians influence. As for Hegel, Wilson notes that Dewey had a brief brush with the
great Prussian but leaves out Dewey‟s comment in 1930 about Hegel‟s lasting impact upon
him.118 Wilson‟s caveat is that Dewey did not seem to have the fervor of a young intellectual in
any published letters of his early career. “Dewey‟s Hegelian period ought to be seen not as a
period at all but as a point,” writes Wilson to summarize his review.119
David A. Hollinger addresses the problem of pragmatism and history on a larger scale.
Hollinger wants to find out whether there is such a thing as an “American mind” and whether
Dewey and the pragmatists created a dominant philosophy that became a way of life. He breaks
down two strains of pragmatism, partially addressed already, labeling one vein out of Harvard
(James) and the other at Columbia (Dewey). Unlike Wilkins he does not go into the monistpluralist division among pragmatists. Hollinger ranks Dewey with the strain of pragmatists in
line with relativism, moralism, and voluntarism. The author shows that relativism and
voluntarism are both responses in trying to live consistently in a world governed by new

116

R. Jack Wilson, “Dewey's Hegelianism,” review of The American Hegelians; An Intellectual Episode in
the History of Western America, by William Goetzmann, History of Education Quarterly, Spring 1975, 87-92.
117
Wilson, “Dewey's Hegelianism,”88.
118
Wilson, “Dewey's Hegelianism,”90.
119
Wilson, “Dewey's Hegelianism,” 92.

42

scientific laws. Hollinger says that inquiry was important for them because of the uncertainty of
the world.120 “This projection is easiest to illustrate in the case of Dewey, who was forever
insisting that if only people could become scientific in the way they went about things, the
potential for human fulfillment would be liberated from the bondage of a sterile, repressive,
outrageously long-lived antiquity…Dewey‟s devotion was to the process of investigation itself,”
writes Hollinger.121 Dewey, as stated previously, was devoted to the method of inquiry even in
his idea of historiography. Fellow pragmatic-traveler Josiah Royce urged the church in The
Problem of Christianity to become more scientific also.122 In the latter stages of Hollinger‟s
piece he leads the reader to see pragmatism as a way of making life simpler and submitting other
philosophical system to scientism.
James T. Kloppenberg offers the best article on pragmatism‟s role in history among
American historians. Kloppenberg‟s 2006 article, “Pragmatism and the Practice of History: From
Turner and Du Bois to Today,” argues that pragmatism is the unofficial philosophy for most
historians. He traces those historians that have been and are currently influenced by John Dewey
and William James. According to Kloppenberg, since the beginning of the twentieth century,
there have been only three periods that overtly ignored the pragmatists. The first is America
during the Second World War, the second during the height of the Cold-War era, and the third
being the postmodern seventies.
Kloppenberg traces the pragmatists‟ influence on historians, mostly from Dewey,
beginning with James Harvey Robinson to modern historians Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt,
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Margaret Jacob, David Hollinger, and Thomas Haskell among others. In Deweyean fashion, he
concludes his article stating that inquiry and experimentation like Dewey‟s is needed again.
Emphatically, Kloppenberg writes in concluding his article, “it seems fair to conclude that
pragmatism remains, as it was for the new historians and as it has been for more than a century,
among the most important sources of ideas, methods, and inspiration for American historians.”123
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CHAPTER 4
THREE REPLIES TO DEWEY‟S PRAGMATIC THEORY OF HISTORY

If we believe Dewey‟s philosophy that history serves a functional purpose for society, it
raises the question of how historians are to develop content. Are historian‟s to be the conscience
of society? And if so, how does this burden affect research methods? Dewey did not go
unanswered after he wrote on the subject of history. Dewey, always the straightforward
philosopher, tells us in the title of Logic, that history for him is mostly a theory of inquiry.
Arthur Lovejoy was the first to reply to Dewey‟s theory of history directly.
Lovejoy‟s Critique of Dewey
Arthur Lovejoy looks at Dewey‟s critique of historians‟ selection of material. He says
that historiography is necessarily interpretative and explanatory.124 Selection is seminal for
Dewey to unlocking the Pandora‟s Box for historians. Dewey believes if he can show that
selection is done unscientifically, historical research obviously contains serious flaws in the
direction of interpretation. Furthermore, the practice of structural histories, with its causality and
connections, call into question how responsibly this kind of history functions in society. When
traditionalist historian Henry Adams wrote about a dynamic history, in what respect is that
history responsible enough to answer the pressing questions of democracy, Dewey asked? The
scientific claims of nineteenth-century historians were still wrapped up in the Victorian ideal of
moral history, Dewey thought. Lovejoy counters Dewey, asking how historical research is
possible without making judgments and interpretations. When it comes to subject matter,
Lovejoy replies that historians, likewise, are the arbiters in what appears in books.
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Lovejoy rebuts Dewey, writing that historians pick subject-matter because it is
interesting. “Now the only factual generalization which it is safe to make about the selection of
subject-matter by historians is that it is always determined by the interestingness, for the
historian or for somebody, of some question, to which data consisting of texts or other
supposedly evidential material might conceivably yield a more or less probable answer,” writes
Lovejoy.125 He admits that this is not a perfect case against Dewey‟s most damning argument
about the historical selection process. Both thinkers are trying to rescue history from the malaise
of scientific absolutism, dynamism, relativism, and positivism. The answer to historical
objectivity is not available for either one of these philosophers to answer without somehow
reverting to some form of logical positivism. The burgeoning quality that Dewey seeks is the
ability of the historian to rely on a scientifically-based method instead of a sort of transitory
method based only on the historian‟s reasoning alone.
The tone Lovejoy sets in his reply to Dewey is one of teacher to a mislead student.
Lovejoy then replies to Dewey on the question of the kind of methods used in the field of
history. He asks whether the philosopher or the historian is more capable to answer the questions
of the present. In Lovejoy‟s famous monograph The Great Chain of Being, he writes that a
discernible conversation from Plato on is obvious among the great thinkers.126 In that great
conversation philosophers argue about problems of the present. Plato sought to find the perfect
society, so did Aristotle and that conversation continues in some fashion in the modern era.
Lovejoy wants to prove that neither is more capable of answering that question than the other.
According to Lovejoy, the historians are better suited to trace the philosophic conversation. His
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reason is that philosophers confuse subject matter because they try to add to the conversation as
opposed to understanding it like historians should do.
Another place where Lovejoy breaks with Dewey is on the issue of presentism. Lovejoy
writes that Dewey is really asking historians to be more like philosophers.127 Lovejoy says that
historians should study men of the past and the interests of men in the past for the past not the
present.128 Conclusively, he is arguing that if historians operate under the assumption of taking
care of present problems that they cease to be historians but become philosophers instead.
Lovejoy agrees with Dewey that the historian writes in the present for the people of today but not
as a way of answering public problems. Ultimately, Dewey and Lovejoy at this point are
debating about detachment. Dewey shows that if historians are detached from their research then,
for historians especially, what good is the research if it does not benefit people now!
In the end, Lovejoy has to concede to Dewey that history does suffer from a lack of
concern for human agency; however, he stops short of endorsing Dewey‟s belief that history
should reflect reality. According to Lovejoy, “the historian's procedure obviously always is, de
facto, determined by a present interest in some historical question; but I am unable to see that
either his proximate or ultimate „focus‟ need be determined by the pertinence of the events which
he seeks to investigate to our present philosophical or social problems.”129 He concedes to
Dewey that the present does play a role in selection of documentary evidence and the
interestingness of research. Lovejoy does not go further and he suggests that historians are
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allowed to construct the ideals based on history. Invariably he thinks Dewey is asking too much
of historians, especially to be able to provide a “useful” element to history writing.
Dewey and Lovejoy both question historians‟ ability to live up to the modernist objective
of detachment. Dewey does this more so than Lovejoy. They are asking historians to conform to
the scientific model of research. The scientific model enables historians to remove themselves
from circumstances to do their research. However, the caveat is that this kind of history is not
any better for human agency but comes close to Rankean history, which Dewey disliked. Of
course, we already know that Dewey does not agree that facts and evidence do all of the thinking
for the historian. The detached modern historian is supposed to remove himself or herself from
feelings of ideology and politics, basically a self autonomous from all external influences.130
As a consequence of this debate, the role of human agency takes a prominent role in the
argument. Lovejoy does not aim to alienate people from history like the traditionalist and
conservative schools of history. Lovejoy shares a pragmatic view of history with Dewey. He
believes that it is necessary to have history because it is the foundation for all thinking. “For all
knowledge, except in the spurious sense mentioned-all science and all practical intelligence-rest
upon history,” he writes.131 The historical serves us in a collective fashion to stabilize common
knowledge and provide a foundation for thinking. When leaning upon something it is the method
that will provide the way out of dilemma and not the content or tradition to fall back upon.
Lovejoy decides to take a different route from Dewey again, insisting that method is more
spurious.
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Lovejoy believes that historians cannot rely upon method only. In providing an example
of astronomy, Lovejoy writes that contemporary astronomers get little help from Aristotle‟s
research on the same subject.132 He says that method changes and continues to change. Dewey
agrees with Lovejoy on this important fact about the traditional as a fallback point. Because if
the astronomers are interested in how astronomy is done now, technically they should study the
way it was done when Aristotle started doing astronomy. Lovejoy moves forward again stating
that the historian is in a “presenticentric predicament.”133 On the one hand, if history does not
show a problem in methodology, Lovejoy says, and then it is not history; it is propaganda. In the
conclusion of his argument, Lovejoy writes the history must fall back on canon.134 He does not
successfully refute Dewey but instead reinforces his argument that historians suffer from a
bifurcated consciousness that seeks a democratic method in a traditional manner.
White Chides Dewey and the Progressives
Historian Morton White follows a holistic approach to pragmatism. He takes issue with
Dewey‟s theory of history because it is not a holistic approach and impractical. White believes
that Dewey‟s desire for democracy blinds him to the reality of historical writing.135 The main
element behind White‟s critique of Dewey is to distinguish between the logic and psychology of
historical research.136 In a two-fold argument, White takes on Dewey‟s challenge of selection in
historiography and Beard‟s search for detached objectivity. Of the three critiques of Dewey we
will see, White is the closest to succeeding in bringing Dewey to an impasse.
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White chooses to attack Beard first to try to link his early determinism and his later
relativism to pragmatism‟s wavering foundation for methodology. First, White writes that Beard
is trying to restore metaphysics to history after 1913; this is also an indictment of Dewey. The
First World War in Europe sent shockwaves in America, especially American intellectuals.
Historicism and metaphysical philosophies were common among American academicians until
the First World War caused them to question their sensibilities. Historians did not want to fall
back on relativism and abandon their professions to faith as Beard did in 1933. Instead, they
tinkered with methods they thought made history more responsible. White questions the
Progressives and Dewey‟s attack on Rankean history. Dewey found that in order to restore a
foundation into research he must accept broad interpretations through inference.137 Where he
struggles with this concept is the ability to find a way around the relativism that broad
interpretation seems to bring along with it. Dewey rejects Rankean history outright; Beard tries
to restore history with a tripartite function.
The first is “history as actuality,” which Beard addressed at the American Historical
Association in 1933.138 Beard‟s famous speech contains a large amount of Dewey‟s pragmatism
despite his embrace of relativism. History as actuality states that history is a process of
knowledge and understands history in its day-to-day process. Secondly, he divides history into
history as knowledge and history as thought. This part history is collection of facts and data. The
final part is historical thought that involves selection, arrangement, interpretation of facts, and
record-based information.139 The first generation of modern American historians, like Beard,
while under the influence of pragmatism, did not understand how to incorporate it as a historical
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method. White says that history is a mental exercise ultimately and it is obviously from a biased
point-of-view.
According to White, Dewey‟s criticism of the selection of documents is a pedagogical or
invalid point. White starts by showing us those historians cannot attempt a whole truth. For
White, world history is not an option, and neither is it a purely scientific explanation. White‟s
answer to this is similar to Deweyan pragmatism. The selection process is not part of the
scientific process, White writes.140 The process of selection is necessarily biased, according to
White, and is nothing to worry about. He shirks off the problem of selection by categorizing it
into psychological and logical categories. The logical side shows that selection can be done
objectively and some underlying notion is being overplayed on Dewey‟s end to explain a hyperselective process that is more imbued with psychological than logic. White relegates selection to
nothing more than a drive to start the research process. Dewey disagrees with him on this point.
The psychology and logic are both a part of the process Dewey believes. But Dewey says that the
two cannot be separated in the real world of research. Historical research is psychological and
logical. Dewey‟s common-sense pragmatism is not attempting to obscure historical research. He
is finding the problems of historical knowledge and in a sense, leaving it to historians to address
the problem.
However, White continues to argue that a synthesis between scientific method and
pluralism suits historical research better than relativism. He quotes Beard responding that the
scientific method cannot produce a full history.141 Beard furthers this into troublesome territory
positing that moral history is preferable before writing. White believes he can bring Beard and
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Dewey together, at least on paper, positing that there is a difference between logic and
psychology of historical interpretation. White‟s approach is much closer to Dewey‟s than it is
Beard‟s position. White is saying that classical pragmatism overplays the role of the scientific
method and that Dewey needs to give room to historians on grounds of psychological
interpretation. White says the bottom line is that the individual is not objective, but that she or he
is still capable of being responsible in research White says.
Nagel on Dewey and Objectivity in Historiography
Interestingly, Ernst Nagel was a professor at Columbia at the same time that Dewey and
Beard were there. Nagel, a philosopher, decided to weigh in to say that there can be objectivity in
historiography.142 He states that there are three general problems discussed about objectivity in
historiography. The first is that historians attempt to make particular statements about history and
not laws; second, historians selection of material introduces subjectivity into historiography; and,
finally, value-charged history introduces personal bias among historians.143
Nagel writes that historians must use universals in history. He says that there is not a way
around generalization. He calls history “idiographic” which is counter to Dewey‟s proposition
that history must be thought about more in terms of people and not generalizations.144 According
to Nagel historians must rely on a foundation of non-repeatable experiences. He goes on to say
that all social sciences rely on non-repeatable research to build upon, a position antithetical to
Dewey‟s proposition. Nagel shows that philosophers who attack history should also attack their
own research methods. He understands that all research relies on foundations that cannot be
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empirically proven in scientific terms. He finds a further way to explain this by differentiating
between “general” versus “individual” conceptual knowledge.145
His answer to Dewey, in a sense, is much the same as Morton White‟s. White
differentiated between logical and psychological differences in research. Here Nagel wants to
show that there are definite boundaries between research that is accepted versus research that is
out of the bounds of academic research. For example, a Holocaust denier can be easily refuted
empirically. This is Nagel‟s example of individual bias. The general or accepted view on
research shows that there is such a thing as the Holocaust and it is irrefutable and, therefore,
accepted. Dewey believed that logical research would weed out bad history. Nagel points out that
Dewey does not address extreme cases of bad history as in the case of a Holocaust denier.
Dewey is only trying to explain the possibilities that remain if historical research is illogical.
Nagel attempts to show us that history is in a constant state of flux. He writes that
historians are in a continual conversation about research method and content. “Indeed, the
relevance of such singular statements to the specific problems under investigation, as well as
their truth, is questions upon which historians are often undecided or unable to achieve
unanimity,” he writes.146 The idea that historians come to universal understanding on every detail
is impossible. Nagel notes that too often philosophers attempting to do the same thing are in a
pattern of self defeat. The circular nature of conversation in each field is one of change,
regression, and acceptance of certain universals, Nagel writes. He shows that is takes years to
come to acceptable answers on current research questions. It seems that Dewey agrees and again
this ultimately proves his point that history is in flux for modern humans.
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Whereas Nagel says that history and people are always in flux, Dewey takes this point as
a way to construct a logical framework for history. Dewey believes the conversation of
philosophy proves problematic for modern humans because they are automatically drawn to
transcendentalism or relativism. The flux leads us to believe in transcendental ways to the truth.
Flux gives a feeling of instability in the day-to-day life. Another problem is that this flux keeps
us from providing our essential use in society. If we cannot be sure about the foundations, then
we have to rely on tradition, faith, and actuality. Dewey says modernism is a sense providing
foundations for people in the day-to-day world without making flux seem too predominant. For
Dewey, religion and faith are reasons for division and unacceptable knowledge; this leads to an
undemocratic, medieval idea of knowledge. Although, Dewey is not unreligious, he asks the
people to try a pragmatic faith first. Dewey thinks history‟s role for people is a map with
knowledge as a guide through life.
Nagel concedes Dewey‟s point, asserting that research is never exhaustive. If we try to
add “wholesale knowledge” to history, according to Nagel, then it leads to all-around skepticism.
He says that we cannot claim wholesale knowledge, first. It is impossible because of selectivity
and since the historical events cannot be replicated. As for justification in the selection process,
Nagel says that there is no answer to why one historian chooses something over another
historian.147 This subjective analysis does not deserve any more discussion.
Nagel writes that value judgments are taken on in two primary views. He says that
selection is a part of the historian‟s value system.148 The historian does pick out that which is
most important to him or her. Nagel calls this value impregnation because it supposes that the
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historian‟s motives are caused by natural law or internal motivations. On the other hand, he
quotes another historian in positing that writing without value is naïve.149 The basic idea is that
historians are expected to know everything in their field and in the field of the past. This is where
philosophers and logicians such as Dewey see a connection to the idea of improbable bias. It is a
bias based on value judgment. The value judgment cannot be separated from the historian and
the historian from the research.
Nagel says this kind of critique falls victim to “internality.”150 He says if we place this
kind of rigor on history, we have to place it on all analytic philosophy. Nagel says history is the
unmovable foundation for all the arts and sciences. He tells us if we move logical necessity to the
study of history, it will change the complete foundation from which philosophy is done. History
is essential to the logic necessity of philosophy. Nagel knows that Beard relied on determinism,
and later faith, when methodology seemed incomplete. He is asking for philosophers, Dewey
mainly, to concede the basis of history as a working foundation.
Dewey is trying to make historical method workable. Nagel retorts that history cannot
provide full reality.151 According to Nagel that logical connection in past events cannot be fully
explained in a history textbook. He says that it is an impossibility. This leads Nagel to the next
point about connexion in historiography. He claims that sociology is destroying history because
it says that history is written by survivors.152
Nagel raises a host of issues over the belief that if winners write history, history is not
objective. First, he says that culture decides the outcome of the study, but it does not necessarily
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harm research. For example, whereas the culture of the Cold War in America produced proAmerican historiography, now there are historians who are correcting the bias in these older
histories. His second point is that no inquiry takes place in an intellectual vacuum.153 Nagel says
that all research is necessarily historicized. Leo Strauss agrees with Nagel on this point. Strauss
posits that philosophers, in his case, have to write esoterically in order to have their research
accepted by their modern peers.154 Strauss differs from Nagel when he writes that ideas must not
be determined through culture. Nagel agrees with Dewey and the pragmatists that information is
filtered through culture and cannot be separated from the modern.
In Nagel‟s final two points, he dances dangerously close to relativism and historicism.
Nagel‟s third point is that standards of validity are causal and always related to culture.155 He
writes that biased thinking is a part of the research and that it is possible to correct bias in
research.156 The last point is a somewhat obscure as Nagel attempts argues that historical
research is warranted on its own terms. He finalizes with a quote from Karl Mannheim when he
writes that historical research is affected by external forces (subjectivity).157 Nagel‟s response is
to correct the perspective, correct the subjective forces, and hope for thorough research despite.
Unlike Dewey who places all the responsibility on the historian, Nagel says that the reader is as
responsible as the author.158 In this two-fold process he believes it is possible to train the
perspective of both author and reader thus acting cooperatively in the historical process. Nagel‟s
conclusion helps us to understand further where Dewey is attempting to take history. From this
perspective it does not appear that Dewey is attempting a relativistic view of history.
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The phase that Dewey and so many American historiographers were dealing with in the
twentieth century is how to write fair history while not alienating the person, which is supposed
to be what history is really about. Beard‟s answer was history as actuality, and Dewey foresaw
this happening as the twentieth century progressed. Mainly, the issue is how to include history
and personhood while maintaining objectivity. Dewey‟s answer is practicality in place of the
structuralism of the Rankean school. While Dewey is not a relativist, he is not certain how
historiography in the twentieth century should proceed exactly. In place of structuralism and
relativism, Dewey developed historical naturalism, something his student John Herman Randall
expounded after Dewey‟s death.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDING THE PERSON IN HISTORY

John Herman Randall, Jr. is perhaps Dewey‟s most articulate student of the pragmatic
philosophy of history. Randall‟s exposition on history is the closest to what Dewey might have
written. Randall connects Dewey‟s practicality and application into a complete philosophy of
history.
Randall calls his historiography historical naturalism. This is not unexpected since
Dewey classifies himself as a naturalistic empiricist. As a pragmatist, and more importantly a
student of Dewey‟s, Randall puts several things into play that critics ignore when dealing with
Dewey‟s theory of history. First, Randall shows that Dewey makes the present a slave to the
past. Randall writes that Dewey appreciates the past and uses the past to construct solutions to
problems, thus meeting the past with criticism and construction.
The Role of Tradition in Historical Method
John Dewey is not against history nor the traditional aspects of history.159 History serves
as an integral foundation for pragmatism. It is improbable that pragmatists are somehow
nihilistic when dealing with the past.160 Invariably seems to be how pragmatic historiography is
thought about in collective memory. The cause of this is most likely because neo-pragmatist
Richard Rorty tended towards relativism in the early part of his career. It is both a
misunderstanding of pragmatism in general and lack of research on behalf of Dewey‟s primary
material as well. Furthermore, Dewey tells the reader in Unity and Progress that the study of
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history is in decline because history has not progressed passed the pre-Enlightenment phase.161
He does not prefer grand narratives nor does he like focusing too closely on particulars.
Randall says that the day-to-day experiences bring history‟s traditional aspects into
broader focus.162 It is now clearer what Dewey is asking of historians. Dewey supports a blend of
Thucydidean history with its heavy use of empiricism and progressive history‟s use of new
methods blended with its recognition of people in history. History is to deal with facts, studies of
cultures and peoples. What history does not focus on is the science of predicting outcomes.
When examining Dewey‟s writings as a whole, he appears to be less radical and relativistic than
supporters and critics believe. Randall says that function in the pragmatic philosophy of history
is more than an epistemological function. Experience is the function for presenting history
now.163 It is not just an epistemological function. Pragmatists are not attempting to war with
other philosophers‟ philosophies but out to change the methods instead. Pragmatism is a function
of acting responsibly in the world.
There are two ways that Randall says that historians should act primarily to be
responsible. First, a new philosophy of history that considers human experience‟s role in the
scientific method is necessary. Randall says that Classical pragmatism did not provide all the
answers about human agency‟s role in the scientific method. It served the function of “opening
the can of worms” and leaving that answer to other generations of philosophers under Dewey‟s
influence. Randall equates knowing and history as functions of human activity.164 In a sense, this
is an excellent summation of Dewey‟s philosophy of history. Dewey wanted to revamp the
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Thucydidean view of history into an approach/method. It is empirical historical research with
people as the subject and persons as the writers, and yet there is a sense that Dewey expects a
positive outcome from this kind of research as well. Dewey says that some parts of traditional
history should be meshed into the progressive nature of history.165 Tradition and morality,
according to Dewey, have roles in history. This role recognizes that tradition backs up science
and progressivism.
Science and tradition serve as verifying principles in the pragmatist‟s historical
schemata.166 The crystal ball effect that Dewey refers to is the unscientific method of
eschatology. He mirrors this statement for the same reason he says he is not a communist.
According to Dewey, the eschatological crisis in Soviet Communism is the reason for its moral
breakdown. Another reason Dewey says that he is not a communist is because it ignores all of
history to form its system; thus it does not understand how people progress.167 Dewey, as a
progressive, defended the United States on the ground that history in America is functional and
more adapt to change and amenability than it was in Soviet Russia. When Dewey witnessed the
show trials put on by Stalin in the Soviet Union, he equated this to an unwillingness of a society
to adapt.168 Dewey says this is the antithesis of history‟s function. This is not a patriotic point by
Dewey but a way of showing that the pragmatic methodology of historiography works in the
United States. Randall backs up Dewey, writing that all values are amenable, and later in the
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Jamesian fashion, tells the reader that historical knowledge is pluralistic and the source for
unification of all knowledge.169
Dewey‟s history is pluralistic and geographic in nature. Europe is unprogressive and
eschatological. This is no more obvious than it was during the First World War. The United
States is not under the burden of eschatology. Pluralism serves as a necessary check to the
structuralism of the traditionalists. When historians become rigid in predicting outcomes,
progress stops, according to Dewey. People‟s progress ceases when war becomes the only
apparent outcome. Progress is moral, and if history stops progress, history becomes immoral.
Randall expounds on how Dewey feels about immoral history. “The past leaves a deposit
of materials and resources, which see limits, „determine‟ what man can do in dealing with those
imposed problems,” Randall writes.170 People should not be stopped by limits brought on to them
by history. History should evolve and be adaptable to peoples‟ needs. When history is not used
properly, for the benefit of people, propagandists have taken it over. A pragmatic understanding
of history does not want to impose history (new problems) on people. Modernism, according to
them, has already sent man searching for a foundation; history should provide light on the
search. Rightly or not, Dewey thinks that burdening man with the issue of the past both creates
war (WWI), decadence (Germany), and totalitarianism through eschatology (USSR). In order for
the American worker to get to work or school their children, he or she must not be contemplating
the problems of the forefathers but use science to create new methods to answer today‟s
problems.
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Randall writes all of this to show us that history is interdisciplinary in its effort to find
more accurate knowledge. He says that historiography is “world historical” in nature.171 All of
this is a response to the challenge that history is not sufficient enough on its own terms to come
to coherent truth. Instead of falling back on faith as historiography and Beard‟s history as
actuality, Randall is attempting to show that history draws from a host of knowledge.
“Knowledge of methods and techniques is the dynamic in all historical decision,” he writes.172
Dewey appreciates interdisciplinary knowledge but does not come outright and state it regarding
history. It is not unlikely that he would not have supported this though. He wanted to have a
workable historiography and the approach is open to discussion with variable techniques.
Randall thinks that opening up history to other knowledge is a safer bet than faith-driven history.
His prediction is prophetic as historiography in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
continually moves towards an interdisciplinary approach.173 Randall finally comes to posit that
the value of history is that it leads to the origin of problems. This historical method is valuable
on two levels. The first is interdisciplinary in nature and the second is that using history is like
tracing the origin of some problem. The premise is shedding light on the origin of the problem
and fixing it as a result.
The Individual‟s Role in the Study of History

One of the overarching questions of twentieth-century historiography is how to deal with
the question of personhood and its place in history. How do we write fair history, include the
excluded, and how can one methodology aim at this noble standard? Dewey‟s answer to that
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question is that people become grist mill for history because education and unity are not themes
in research. In the age of Enlightenment, knowledge was mastery of institutions and law. Since
historians cannot reach the same conclusions, then agreeing upon unity is an integral part of
understanding human progress. Currently, a new breed of thinkers is building upon the idea of
people‟s role in history and how the role leads to a better understanding of personhood. To
conclude this thesis we will explore how the self and its modern Cartesian model can help
explain the problem of historical knowledge in twentieth-century historiography. Dewey answers
the question of personhood in history and the role pragmatism plays together in order to further
map out a pluralistic view of historiography.
John Dewey never wrote directly about the role of the person in history. He did not have
to since his philosophy is concerned with human agency in the world. Dewey, as a classical
pragmatist, says the person is the main building block in history. History is an extension of the
social role of education while people are the building blocks for history. When Dewey looks for
answers to society‟s greatest problems such as poverty, poor health, negligence, homelessness,
and a lack of education, he says we must study people and construct a historical methodology
that will shed light on the problems of people. “History is the passing of daily events,” he writes.
“This is the only history there is.”174 In Dewey‟s case the problems of man, human direction,
culminate in history passing day-by-day. The ancient question of understanding events, wars,
politics, and structural issues are a product of a bygone era. “Knowledge of history is necessary
to know how things came to be,” he writes. “The past does not have force.”175 When Dewey
writes about history it is dispassionate with formulation for today‟s problems. On one level
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Dewey is correct. History in America does not have the importance that it did in Greece or Rome
during the height of its empires. He means if Americans are still trying to find where individuals
belong, how can they develop a unified history with this crisis of conscious continually in the
background? This can be summed up by simply knowing that technology took on a more
predominant role in the twentieth century. The problem for Dewey to solve is educating the
individual in conjunction with the movement of mass technology and science.
In The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Dewey traces the methodology of history
back to Darwin. The reason is possibly because the Cartesian model of self reliance and rational
methodology cannot answer the problem of historical method, which might even cause more
problems than it solves. Dewey tells us in Influence that Darwin‟s philosophy and methodology
are not new but that his method works in history. Dewey explains that “old ways” are not
resolved; rather we simply recognize them more as time passes.176 He questions the ability of
people to solve their own problems when he shows the people forget the problems they first try
to solve. Problems and questions belong to an age, or generation. As the ages change, so do ideas
and a way to get answers. The only way to slow this down would be to stop time. So, Dewey is
attempting a reconstruction of the philosophy of history by making it practical. His philosophy
appears nihilistic, but it is also a reaction against the Cartesian model of intrinsic personhood.
The way that methodology and history are changed is by the rapidity of life. Reading Herodotus
will not necessarily help the average person in everyday life. If the historian could apply the
principles of Herodotus to life, then reading Herodotus would be extremely valuable.
Darwin was not sure how the person fits into history, but Dewey sees him as viewing
history as happening naturally around the individual. History happens to individuals. According
176
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to Dewey people need historians for the purpose of knowing the past; however, when human
agency is lost, history becomes a burden to people.
Today there is a sense that personhood has been lost since the onset of modernity and its
twin, postmodernity. The study of the person is lost in part because Darwin did not categorically
find the origin of the person but was more interested in tracing evolutionary progress of species.
It is lost because the theological implications of origin are written out of history in large part and
partially because what we call a person has a variable definition. Setting the definition is the next
step to finding the person in historiography.
Charles Taylor, a philosopher who studies individualism in history, gives us a standing
definition of the person. “Philosophers consider that to be a person in the full sense of yourself as
an agent, a being which can thus make plans for your life, one who also holds values in virtue of
which different such plans seem better or worse, and who is capable of choosing between
them.”177 Taylor asserts that people are different from other beings because of their ability to
self-interpret. The ability to self-interpret is along the same lines that pragmatist thought is about
the person. Dewey wants the person to be able to interpret the age better through self knowledge
and understanding. His philosophy of history says as much as he heeds us to be both practical
and forgiving of the age.
For Dewey the past and the present coalesce into the person. “Whatever harm or loss a
right act may bring to the self in some of its aspects---even extending to destruction of the bodily
self, - the inmost moral self finds fulfillment and consequent happiness in the good,” Dewey
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writes about personhood.178 Dewey is saying that each person cannot find happiness in linking
herself or himself to nothing. For example, where late modernity falls victim to detaching the
self and losing the sense of personhood in history, Dewey‟s modernity finds both a coherent self
and reliable narrative for that selfhood in practicality of methods. This is the underlying
philosophy of Deweyan pragmatism and its benefit to history.
Looking back over Dewey‟s influence on historians there are two specifics that should
come to mind. The first is that pragmatism helps bridge the gap between personhood and history.
And, second, the person in Deweyan pragmatism is also of a communal nature and a connecting
agent in history. Pragmatism and Dewey in particular are concerned about people and how they
develop over time. Dewey wants people to understand themselves and their surroundings. In
How We Think he writes that the best thinking is a synthesis between easy and difficult ways of
knowing.179 However, abstract and subject matter that is too difficult leads to alienation and
burden. Thinking that is too easy is not good either because it causes people to become soft in
the act of knowing. Both types of extremes cause alienation and loss of personhood. His answer
is bringing the two together for hope of a better kind of inquiry and in a sense, a better
personhood. Michael Lacey agrees, insisting that pragmatism, while leaving traditional roots of
inquiry, did not actually leave the traditional philosophical foundations.
Lacey writes that classical pragmatists such as Dewey, James, and Pierce understood
behavior and personalities to be normative.180 Furthermore, Lacey writes is that the original
American pragmatists ground their philosophy in communitarian public philosophy and modern
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religious thought. Lacey‟s says that pragmatists did not throw out religion but used it to ground
the person in history.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
That the self is central to Dewey‟s historiography is obvious by now. One of the main
reasons that pragmatism is so relevant today is because people feel alienated from academic
history.181 Dewey rejected much of the Enlightenment for its contribution to people‟s alienated
feeling in history. In attempting to rework philosophy and untie it from the restraints of the
Continental school, Dewey sought freedom for people, even freedom from the bonds of history.
Both Dewey and James thought that people in history should be free from tradition,
orthodoxy, secularism, religiosity, and other distracting concerns. Both philosophers realize that
a part of personhood is lost in modernity. The person is rooted in a history of relationships. If the
common man is included in history, it changes the way human agency is thought about in
history.182 Dewey‟s philosophy is open with potential for further elaboration. What is not lost is
the application for the method of history and a recovery of the person.
There are three things on which classical pragmatists rested their foundation for the
person according to Murray Murphy. The first is a real world where knowledge can be known.
The second is that human agency can be explained in the past and present. The final point is that
members of a community can be understood in history because of psychic unity.183 Murphy
writes that this psychic unity is a human want to study, be studied, know the past, and have an
appropriate method of understanding the past. Dewey gives us further insight into what this
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means for him. “The moral act is one which sustains a whole complex system of values,” he
contends; it is “one which keeps vital and progressive the industrial order, science, art, and the
state.”184 For Dewey the person is grounded in a system that includes everything from art and
government to the individuals understanding and participation in all of this. A better
understanding of history is gained when individuals clearly understands their surroundings.
It is relevant to go back and see that Dewey considered written history only a “naïve”
way to go about history.185 Dewey understood that history is not only what is written but how the
individual places himself or herself according to history. History from Dewey‟s point of view
may come off as utilitarian, but in its essence Dewey gets to the heart of the matter. The person
is the hub of historiography. Floating ideas around a framework of history will not work, as
Dewey shows. His idea of historiography is that the person is the center of the universe and
displacing the art of personhood, with relativism and ideology, creates displacement of people.
Again, we must return to Dewey‟s writings on education. In Experience and Education, he calls
the educator a Platonist.186 What he means by this is that the educator is to facilitate learning.
While demonstrating the role of the teacher as both philosopher and agitator, it is interesting to
note that he chose the most traditional of all philosophers. As the modern individual is in
constant flux, Dewey later writes that the past must not be forgotten and it must be remembered
in order to understand the present. This is not cliché because anywhere experience is key; the
knowledge of the past must be exerted.187
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Dewey‟s historical method is not fail safe. It is open to scrutiny. The positive aspects far
outweigh the negative. The requirement of putting the individual at the center of history is a
major aspect of Dewey‟s historiography. But the individual cannot be complete without both an
understanding of the present and the past as Dewey has shown us. There is a communal aspect to
historiography too. When the foundation or tradition of history is removed from knowledge, as
Beard and Croce demonstrated, then the individual becomes detached and uncertain. The
common thread is that Dewey‟s version of historical naturalism keeps history in line by
preserving the method and updating its character.

70

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Appleby, Joyce, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacobs Telling the Truth about History. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.

Anton, John. Naturalism and historical understanding. Albany: Albany State University of New
York Press, 1967.
Barzun, Jacques. A stroll with William James. New York: Harper & Row, 1983.

Beard, Charles. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1921.
Blau, Joseph L. Men and movements in American philosophy. New York: Prentice Hall, 1952.

Breisbach, Ernst A. American Progressive History: An Experiment in Modernization. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Buber, Martin. Between man and man. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Carrithers, Michael, Steven Collins and Steve Lukes The Category of the person:
anthropology, philosophy, history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Clark, Gordon H. Dewey. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1960.
———. Historiography: secular and religious. Jefferson, Md.: Trinity Foundation,
1994.
Coughlan, Neil. Young John Dewey: an essay in American intellectual history. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975.

71

Curti, Merle. The Growth of American Thought. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964.

Dewey, John. The Collected Works of John Dewey. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston. 37 Vols.
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1991.
———. Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965.

———. Essays in Experimental Logic. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1916.

———. Experience and Education. West Lafayette, Ind.: Kappa Delta Pi, 1998.

———. German philosophy and politics. New York: H. Holt, 1915.

———. How we think. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 1910.

———. Logic, the theory of inquiry. New York: H. Holt and Company, 1938.
———. On Experience, nature, and freedom: represenative selections. New York: Liberal
Arts Press, 1960.
———. The influence of Darwin on philosophy, and other essays in contemporary
thought. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1910.

Dewey, John and James H. Tufts. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908.

Edmondson, Henry T. Edmondson. John Dewey & The Decline of American Education.
Wilmington: ISI Books, 2006.

Evans, C. Stephen. Preserving the Person: a look at the human sciences. Downers Grove, Ill.:
InterVarsity Press, 1977.
Federici, Michael P. Eric Voegelin: the restoration of order . Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002.
72

Goeztman, William H., ed., The American Hegelians: an intellectual episode in the history of
Western America. New York: Knopf, 1973.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. New York: Humanities
Press, 1963.

Hickman, Larry., and Thomas Alexander ed., The Essential Dewey. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1998.

Hofstadter, Richard. The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington. New York:
Vintage Books, 1970.

Hook, Sidney. John Dewey: philosopher of science and freedom; a symposium. New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1967.
———. John Dewey; an intellectual portrait. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971.

Hunt, Lynn., ed. The New Cultural History. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1989.

Hughes-Warrington, Marnie. Fifty Key Thinkers on History . New York: Routledge, 2000.

Iggers, Georg G. Historiography in the Twentieth century: from scientific objectivity to the
postmodern challenge . Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1997.

Kennedy, David. Freedom from Fear: the American people in depression and war, 1929-1945.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Lewis, C.S. The abolition of man: or, Reflections on education with special reference to the
teaching of English in the upper forms of schools . New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being: a study of the the history of an idea: the Williams
James lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1933. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1964.
73

Lowith, Karl. Meaning in History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Macintyre, Alasdair. Against the Self Images of the Age. New York: Schocken Books, 1971.

McClay, Wilfred., ed., Figures in the Carpet: finding the human person in the American past.
Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007.
Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002.

Meyerhoff, Hans, ed., The Philosophy of History in our Time: an anthology. Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1959.
Misak, Cheryl. New Pragmatists. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Morris, Colin. The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Nash, Ronald H, ed., Ideas of History. 1969: Dutton, New York.

———. The Meaning of History. Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1998.
Novick, Peter. That Noble Dream: The “objectivity question” and the American Historical
Profession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Randall, John Herman. Nature and Historical experience; essays in naturalism and in the theory
of history. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

Robinson, James Harvey. The New History: Essays Illustrating the Modern Historical Outlook.
New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Russell, Bertrand. The History of Western Philosophy. Simon & Schuster, 1972.
74

Santayana, George. The German Mind; a philosophical diagnosis. New York: Crowell, 1968.

Schillp, Paul Arthur, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey. Chicago: Northwestern University
Press, 1939.

Shook, John R and Joseph Margolis ed., A Companion to Pragmatism. Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2006.

Shook, John R. Dewey's empirical theory of knowledge and reality . Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2000.

Singer, Peter. Hegel: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Sorokin, Pitirim A. The crisis of our age; the social and cultural outlook. New York: Dutton,
1941.
Strathern, Paul. Hegel in 90 Minutes. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1997.

Taylor, Charles. Hegel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
———. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1989.

Thayer, H.S. Meaning and action: a critical history of pragmatism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1968.
———. The logic of pragmatism; an examination of John Dewey's logic. New York:
Humanities Press, 1952.
Vitz, Paul C., and Susan M. Felch, eds., The Self: Beyond the Postmodern Crisis. Wilmington:
ISI Books, 2006.

75

White, Morton. Pragmatism and the American mind; essays and reviews in philosophy and
intellectual history. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
———. The Origins of John Dewey’s Instrumentalism. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1943.
Wiener, Philip P., ed. Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Five volumes. New York: Scribner‟s,
1973.

ARTICLES
Beard, Charles A. "Written History as an Act of Faith." The American Historical Review 39, no.
2 (Jan. 1934): 219-231.
Blau, Joseph L. “John Dewey‟s Theory of History.” The Journal of Philosophy 57, no. 3 (April,
1952): 89-100.
Bordeau, Edward J. "John Dewey's Ideas about the Great Depression." Journal of the History of
Ideas, 32, no.1 (Spring 1971): 67-84.
Cotkin, George. "History's Moral Turn." Journal of the History of Ideas, 2008: 293-315.

Destler, Chester McArthur. "Some Observations on Contemporary Historical Theory." The
American Historical Review, 1950: 503-529.

Diggins, John P. "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual History." Journal of the
History of Ideas, 67, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 181-208.
Good, James A. "John Dewey's „Permanent Hegelian Deposit‟ and the Exigencies of War."
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 44, no. 2 (April, 2006): 293-313.

Hollinger, David A. "The Problem of Pragmatism in American History." The Journal of
American History, 67, no. 1 (June, 1980): 88-107.

76

Kaufmann, Felix. "John Dewey's Theory of Inquiry." The Journal of Philosophy, 56, no. 21
(Oct., 1959): 826-836

Kloppenberg, James T. "Pragmatism and the Practice of History: From Turner and Du Bois to
Today." Metaphilosophy, 35, no. 1-2 (Jan., 2004): 202-225.
Lovejoy, Arthur. "Present Standpoints and Past History,” The Journal of Philosophy 36, no.18
(Aug., 1939): 477-489.

Mead, George H. "The Philosophy of John Dewey." International Journal of Ethics, 1935: 6481.

Provenzo, Jr. , Eugene L. "History as Experiment: The Role of the Laboratory School in
the Development of John Dewey's Philosophy of History." The History Teacher, 12, no.
3 (May, 1979): 373-382.
Roosevelt, Theodore. “History as Literature.” The American Historical Review 18, no. 3 (April,
1913): 473-489.
Sherlock, Richard. “The Secret of Straussianism.” Modern Age 48 (2006): 208-216.

Wilkins, Burleigh Taylor. "James, Dewey, and Hegelian Idealism." Journal of the History of
Ideas, 17, no. 3 (June, 1956): 332-346.

———. "Pragmatism as a Theory of Historical Knowledge: John Dewey on
the Nature of Historical Inquiry." The American Historical Review, 64, no. 4 (July,
1959): 878:890.

Wilson, R. Jack. “Review: Dewey's Hegelianism.” History of Education Quarterly 15, no. 1
(Spring, 1975): 87-92.

WEB CONTENT

77

Ecker, Pam. “John Dewey.” Spring 1997.
http://www.bgsu.edu/departments/acs/1890s/dewey/dewey.html (accessed 6 Dec. 2008).

Heydt, Colin. “John Stuart Mill: Overview.” 2006. http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/milljs.htm
(accessed 9 October 2008).
Redding, Paul. “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.” 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/
(accessed 14 July 2008).
Wren, Chase B. Chase B. Wrenn, “Naturalistic Epistemology.” 2009
http://www.iep.utm.edu/n/nat-epis.htm (accessed 31 March 2009).

78

VITA
SETH J. BARTEE

Personal Data:

Date of Birth: Dec. 6, 1979
Place of Birth: Bristol, Tennessee
Marital Status: Married

Education:

Public Schools, Bristol, Tennessee
B.S., History, East Tennessee State University, Johnson
City, Tennessee, 2005
M.A. History, East Tennessee State University, Johnson
City, Tennessee, 2009

Professional Experience:

Graduate Assistant, East Tennessee State University, 2008-09
Teaching Assistant, East Tennessee State University, 2007-08

Journalist, Bristol Herald Courier; Bristol, Va., 2003-2007

79

